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Differentially Private Formation Control
Calvin Hawkins and Matthew Hale∗
Abstract
As multi-agent systems proliferate, there is increasing demand for coordination protocols that protect agents’
sensitive information while allowing them to collaborate. To help address this need, this paper presents a differentially
private formation control framework. Agents’ state trajectories are protected using differential privacy, which is
a statistical notion of privacy that protects data by adding noise to it. We provide a private formation control
implementation and analyze the impact of privacy upon the system. Specifically, we quantify tradeoffs between
privacy level, system performance, and connectedness of the network’s communication topology. These tradeoffs are
used to develop guidelines for calibrating privacy in terms of control theoretic quantities, such as steady-state error,
without requiring in-depth knowledge of differential privacy. Additional guidelines are also developed for treating
privacy levels and network topologies as design parameters to tune the network’s performance. Simulation results
illustrate these tradeoffs and show that strict privacy is inherently compatible with strong system performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent systems, such as robotic swarms and social networks, require agents to share information to collab-
orate. In some cases, the information shared between agents may be sensitive. For example, self-driving cars share
location data to be routed to a destination. Geo-location data and other data streams can be quite revealing about
users and sensitive data should be protected. However, this data must still be useful for multi-agent coordination.
Thus, privacy in multi-agent control must simultaneously protect agents’ sensitive data while guaranteeing that
privatized data enables the network to achieve a common task.
This type of privacy has recently been achieved using differential privacy. Differential privacy stems from the
computer science literature, where it was originally used to protect sensitive data when databases are queried [1], [2].
Differential privacy is appealing because it is immune to post-processing and robust to side information [1]. These
properties mean that privacy guarantees are not compromised by performing operations on differentially private
data, and that they are not weakened by much by an adversary with additional information about data-producing
agents [3].
Recently, differential privacy has been applied to dynamic systems [4]–[12]. One form of differential privacy
in dynamic systems protects sensitive trajectory-valued data, and this is the notion of differential privacy used in
this paper. Privacy of this form ensures that an adversary is unlikely to learn much about the state trajectory of a
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2system by observing its outputs. In multi-agent control, this lets an agent share its outputs with other agents while
protecting its state trajectory from those agents and eavesdroppers [4]–[7].
In this paper, we develop a framework for private multi-agent formation control using differential privacy.
Formation control is a well-studied network control problem and can be robots physically assembling into geometric
shapes or non-physical agents maintaining relative state offsets. For differential privacy, agents add privacy noise
to their states before sharing them with other agents. The other agents use privatized states in their update laws,
and then this process repeats at every time step. Adding privacy noise makes this problem equivalent to a certain
consensus protocol with measurement noises. This paper focuses on private formation control, though the methods
presented can be used to design and analyze other private consensus-style protocols. The private formation control
protocol can be implemented in a completely distributed manner, and, contrary to some other privacy approaches,
it does not require a central coordinator.
Beyond the privacy implementation, we develop guidelines for calibrating privacy in formation control. Specifi-
cally, we bound the quality of formation, or performance of the system, in terms of agents’ privacy parameters and
connectedness of the network. We develop guidelines by using these bounds to trade off degraded performance for
stricter privacy requirements and a less connected communication topology. This ultimately allows us to formulate
privacy guidelines based on control-theoretic properties without requiring users to have an in-depth understanding
of differential privacy. Guidelines are also developed by analyzing the sensitivity of system performance to changes
in privacy parameters and communication topology to determine which has a larger impact on system performance.
Furthermore, we develop necessary and sufficient conditions for when private formation control networks achieve
a desired performance level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives graph theory and differential privacy background.
Section III states the differentially private formation control problem and Section IV solves it. Section V provides
guidelines for calibrating privacy based on performance requirements for specific communication topologies. In
Section VI, we analyze the sensitivity of system performance to changes in privacy and communication topology.
Next, Section VII provides simulations, and Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section we briefly review the required background on graph theory and differential privacy.
A. Graph Theory Background
A graph G = (V,E) is defined over a set of nodes V and edges are contained in the set E. For N nodes, V is
indexed over {1, ..., N}. The edge set of G is a subset E ⊆ V ×V , where the pair (i, j) ∈ E if nodes i and j share a
connection and (i, j) /∈ E if they do not. This paper considers undirected, weighted, simple graphs. Undirectedness
means that an edge (i, j) ∈ E is not distinguished from (j, i) ∈ E. Simplicity means that (i, i) /∈ E for all i ∈ V .
Weightedness means that the edge (i, j) ∈ E has a weight wij = wji > 0. Of particular interest are connected
graphs.
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3Definition 1 (Connected Graph): A graph G is connected if, for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, i 6= j, there is a sequence
of edges one can traverse from node i to node j. △
This paper uses the weighted graph Laplacian, which is defined with weighted adjacency and weighted degree
matrices. The weighted adjacency matrix A(G) ∈ RN×N of G is defined element-wise as
A(G)ij =


wij (i, j) ∈ E
0 otherwise
.
Because we only consider undirected graphs, A(G) is symmetric. The weighted degree of node i ∈ V is defined as
di =
∑
j|(i,j)∈E wij . The maximum degree is dmax = maxi di. The degree matrix D(G) ∈ RN×N is the diagonal
matrix D(G) = diag(d1, ..., dN ). The weighted Laplacian of G is then defined as L(G) = D(G) −A(G).
Let λk(·) be the kth smallest eigenvalue of a matrix. By definition, λ1(L(G)) = 0 for all graph Laplacians and
0 = λ1(L(G)) ≤ λ2(L(G)) ≤ · · · ≤ λN (L(G)).
The value of λ2(G)) plays a key role in this paper and is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Algebraic Connectivity [13]): The algebraic connectivity of a graph G is the second smallest eigen-
value of its Laplacian and G is connected if and only if λ2(L(G)) > 0. △
Agent i’s neighborhood set N(i) is the set of all agents agent i can communicate with, defined as N(i) = {j |
(i, j) ∈ E}.
B. Differential Privacy Background
This section provides a brief description of the differential privacy background needed for the remainder of the
paper. More complete expositions can be found in [4], [14]. Overall, the goal of differential privacy is to make similar
pieces of data appear approximately indistinguishable from one another. Differential privacy is appealing because its
privacy guarantees are immune to post-processing [14]. For example, private data can be filtered without threatening
its privacy guarantees [4], [15]. More generally, arbitrary post-hoc computations on private data do not harm
differential privacy. In addition, after differential privacy is implemented, an adversary with complete knowledge of
the mechanism used to implement privacy has no advantage over another adversary without mechanism knowledge
[1], [2].
In this paper we use differential privacy to privatize state trajectories of mobile autonomous agents. We consider
vector-valued trajectories of the form Z = (Z(1), Z(2), ..., Z(k), ...), where Z(k) ∈ Rd for all k. The ℓp norm of
Z is defined as ‖Z‖ℓp =
(∑∞
k=1 ‖Z(k)‖pp
) 1
p , where ‖ · ‖p is the ordinary p-norm on Rd. Define the set
ℓdp := {Z | Z(k) ∈ Rd, ‖Z‖ℓp <∞}.
The set ℓdp only contains trajectories that converge to the origin. However, we want to privatize arbitrary
trajectories, including those that do not converge at all. To do so, we consider a larger set of trajectories. Let
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4the truncation operator PT be defined as
PT [y] =


y(k) k ≤ T
0 k > T
.
Then we define the set
ℓ˜dp = {Z | Z(k) ∈ Rd, PT [Z] ∈ ℓdp for all T ∈ N},
and we will privatize state trajectories in this set.
Consider a network of N agents, where agent i’s state trajectory is denoted by yi. The k
th element of agent i’s
trajectory is yi(k) ∈ Rn for n ∈ N. Agent i’s state trajectory belongs to ℓ˜n2 .
Differential privacy is defined with respect to an adjacency relation. We provide privacy to single agents’ state
trajectories (rather than collections of trajectories as in some other works), and our choice of adjacency relation
is defined for single agents. In the case of dynamic systems, the adjacency relation gives a notion of how similar
trajectories are and specifies which trajectories must be made approximately indistinguishable from each other.
Definition 3 (Adjacency [5]): Fix an adjacency parameter bi > 0 for agent i. Adjbi : ℓ˜
n
2 × ℓ˜n2 −→ {0, 1} is defined
as
Adjbi(vi, wi) =


1 ‖vi − wi‖ℓ2 ≤ bi
0 otherwise.
△
In words, two state trajectories of agent i are adjacent if and only if the ℓ2-norm of their difference is upper
bounded by bi. This means that every state trajectory within distance bi from agent i’s state trajectory must be
made approximately indistinguishable from it to enforce differential privacy.
To calibrate differential privacy’s protections, agent i selects privacy parameters ǫi and δi. These parameters
determine the level of privacy afforded to xi. Typically, ǫi ∈ [0.1, ln 3] and δi ≤ 0.01 for all i [5]. The value of
δi can be regarded as the probability that differential privacy fails for agent i, while ǫi can be regarded as the
information leakage about agent i.
The implementation of differential privacy in this work provides differential privacy for each agent individually.
This will be accomplished by adding noise to sensitive data directly, an approach called “input perturbation” privacy
in the literature [16]. The noise is added by a privacy mechanism, which is a randomized map. We now provide
a formal definition of differential privacy, which states the guarantees a mechanism must provide. First, fix a
probability space (Ω,F ,P). We are considering outputs in ℓ˜n2 and use a σ-algebra over ℓ˜n2 , denoted Σn2 [17].
Definition 4 (Differential Privacy): Let ǫi > 0 and δi ∈ [0, 12 ) be given. A mechanism M : ℓ˜n2 × Ω −→ ℓ˜n2 is
(ǫi, δi)-differentially private if, for all adjacent yi, y
′
i ∈ ℓ˜n2 , we have
P[M(yi) ∈ S] ≤ eǫiP[M(y′i) ∈ S] + δi for all S ∈ Σn2 . △
The Gaussian mechanism will be used to implement differential privacy. The Gaussian mechanism adds zero-
mean i.i.d. noise drawn from a Gaussian distribution pointwise in time. Stating the required distribution uses the
Q-function, defined as Q(y) = 1√
2π
∫∞
y
e−
z2
2 dz.
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5Lemma 1 (Gaussian Mechanism [4]): Let bi > 0, ǫi > 0, and δi ∈ (0, 12 ) be given, and fix the adjacency rela-
tion Adjbi . Let yi ∈ ℓ˜n2 . The Gaussian mechanism for (ǫi,δi)-differential privacy takes the form y˜i(k) = yi(k) + wi(k),
where wi is a stochastic process with wi(k) ∼ N (0, σ2i In) and σi ≥ bi2ǫi (Kδi+
√
K2δi + 2ǫi) whereKδi = Q
−1(δi).
This mechanism provides (ǫi,δi)-differential privacy to yi. 
For convenience, let κ(δi, ǫi) =
1
2ǫi
(Kδi +
√
K2δi + 2ǫi).
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we state and analyze the differentially private formation control problem.
Problem 1: Consider a network of N agents with communication topology modeled by the undirected, simple,
connected, and weighted graph G. Let yi(k) be agent i’s state at time k, N(i) be agent i’s neighborhood set, γ > 0,
and wij be a positive weight on the edge (i, j) ∈ E. We define ∆ij ∈ Rn for all (i, j) ∈ E as the desired relative
distance between agents i and j.
i. Implement the formation control protocol
yi(k + 1) = yi(k) + γ
∑
j∈N(i)
wij(yj(k)− yi(k)−∆ij),
in a differentially private manner.
ii. Analyze the relationship between network performance, privacy, and the underlying graph topology. △
We will solve Problem 1 by bounding the performance of the network in terms of the privacy parameters of
each agent and the algebraic connectivity of the underlying graph. This will allow us to analyze the relationship
between performance, privacy, and topology.
Remark 1: We consider formation control in Rn, which is equivalent to running n scalar-valued formation
controllers. Therefore, we analyze the scalar case. This simplifies the forthcoming analysis while also giving
a granular error analysis that allows for controlling error in each dimension independently. The n-dimensional
controller is simply an n-fold replication of the scalar-valued controller. If an overall error bound for all dimensions
is necessary, one need only multiply the forthcoming one-dimensional error bounds by the number of dimensions, n.
Before solving Problem 1, we give the necessary definitions for formation control. First, we define agent- and
network-level dynamics. Then, we detail how each agent will enforce differential privacy. Lastly, we explain how
differentially private communications affect the performance of a formation control protocol and how to quantify
quality of a formation.
A. Multi-agent Formation control
The goal of formation control is for agents in a network to assemble into some geometric shape or set of relative
states. Multi-agent formation control is a well researched problem and there are several mathematical formulations
one can use to achieve similar results [18]–[24]. We will define relative distances between agents that communicate
and the control objective is for all agents to maintain the relative distances to each of their neighbors. This approach
is similar to that of [20] and the translationally invariant formations presented in [24].
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6For the formation to be feasible, ∆ij = −∆ji for all (i, j) ∈ E. The network control objective is driving
limk−→∞(yj(k)− yi(k)) = ∆ij for all (i, j) ∈ E. It is important to note that there is an infinite set of points that
can be in formation; the formation can be centered around any point in Rn and meet the control requirement, i.e.,
we allow formations to be translationally invariant [24].
Now we define the agents’ update law. Let {p1, ..., pN} be any collection of points in formation such that
pj − pi = ∆ij for all (i, j) ∈ E and let p = (pT1 , . . . , pTN )T ∈ RnN be the network-level formation specification.
We consider the formation control protocol
yi(k + 1) = yi(k) + γ
∑
j∈N(i)
wij(yj(k)− yi(k)−∆ij). (1)
As noted in Remark 1, we analyze convergence of Equation (1) at the component level. Thus, while yi ∈ Rn, we
select an arbitrary l ∈ {1, . . . , n} and provide analysis for
x(k) =


y1,l(k)
...
yN,l(k)

 ∈ RN ,
i.e., each agents lth component, which proceeds identically for each l ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Below, we also use the vector
of lth components of p, denoted
q =


p1,l
...
pN,l

 .
Let x¯(k) = x(k) − q. Then we analyze
x¯(k + 1) = (I − γL(G))x¯(k). (2)
Letting P = I − γL(G), we may write x¯(k+1) = P x¯(k). In this form, we have the following convergence result.
Lemma 2 ( [23], Theorem 2): If G is connected, P is doubly stochastic, and γ ∈ (0, 1
dmax
), then the protocol in
Equation (2) reaches consensus asymptotically and x¯(k) −→ 1T 1
n
x¯(0)1. 
Because the protocol in Equation (2) reaches consensus over x¯, it solves the translationally invariant formation
control problem [24]. Using δij to denote the state offset between agents j and i in the appropriate dimension, the
node-level protocol in Equation (1) can be rewritten for a single component as
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) + γ
∑
j∈N(i)
wij(xj(k)− xi(k)− δij), (3)
which we use below.
B. Private Communications
When agent j transmits x¯j(k) to the agents in N(j), it is potentially exposing its state trajectory, xj , to them and
adversaries or eavesdroppers. Agent j therefore sends a differentially private version of x¯j(k) to its neighborhood.
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7Agent j starts by selecting privacy parameters ǫj > 0, δj ∈ (0, 12 ), and adjacency relation Adjbj with bj > 0.
Agent j then privatizes its state trajectory xj with the Gaussian mechanism. Let x˜j denote the differentially private
version of xj , where, pointwise in time, x˜j(k) = xj(k) + vj(k), with vj(k) ∼ N (0, σ2j ) and σj ≥ κ(δj , ǫj)bj .
Thus agent j keeps the trajectory xj differentially private. Agent j then shares ˜¯xj(k) = x˜j(k)− qj , which is also
differentially private because subtracting qj is merely post-processing [14].
C. Private Formation Control
When each agent is sharing differentially private information, the node-level formation control protocol becomes
x¯i(k + 1) = x¯i(k) + γ
∑
j∈N(i)
wij(˜¯xj(k)− x¯i(k)), (4)
where agent i uses x¯i rather than ˜¯xi because it always has access to its own unprivatized state. The stochastic
nature of this protocol implies that agents no longer exactly reach a formation, and, in particular, the states will
never exactly converge to a steady-state value.
To analyze performance, let
β(k) :=
1
N
1
Tx(k)1 + q − 1
N
1
T q1,
which is the state vector the protocol in Equation (2) would converge to with initial state x(k) and without
privacy. Also let e(k) = x(k) − β(k), which is the distance of the current state to the state the protocol would
converge to without differential privacy. To quantity the effects of privacy on the network as a whole, let eagg(k) :=
1
n
∑n
i=1 E[e
2
i (k)] be the aggregate error of the network, and let
ess := lim sup
k−→∞ eagg(k) (5)
be the steady-state error of the network.
Problem 1 requires us to quantify the relationship between privacy, encoded by (ǫi, δi); performance, encoded
by ess; and topology, encoded by λ2. These quantitative tradeoffs are the subject of the next section.
IV. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE FORMATION CONTROL
In this section we solve Problem 1. First, we show how the private formation control protocol can be modeled
as a Markov chain. Then, we solve Problem 1 by deriving performance bounds that are functions of the underlying
graph topology and each agent’s privacy parameters.
A. Formation Control as a Markov chain
Problem 1 takes the form of a consensus protocol with Gaussian i.i.d. noise perturbing each agent’s state, which
has been previously studied in [18]. We begin by expanding ˜¯xj(k) in Equation (4), which yields
x¯i(k + 1) = x¯i(k) + γ
∑
j∈N(i)
wij(x¯j(k) + vj(k)− x¯i(k)). (6)
For the purposes of analysis, we will consider equivalent network-level dynamics given as follows.
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8Lemma 3: Let agents use the communication graph G with weighted Laplacian L(G). Then Equation (6) can be
represented at the network level as x¯(k + 1) = P x¯(k) + z(k), where P = I − γL(G) and z(k) ∼ N (0, Z) where
Z = diag(s21, ..., s
2
N ), with s
2
i = γ
2
∑
j∈N(i) w
2
ijσ
2
j .
Proof: Using Equation (3), Equation (6) can be expanded as
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) + γ
∑
j∈N(i)
wij(xj(k)− xi(k)− δij)
+γ
∑
j∈N(i)
wijvj(k).
The last term encodes privacy noise. Without this term we have formation control without noise, which can be
represented at the network level as x¯(k + 1) = P x¯(k). Next, let zi(k) = γ
∑
j∈N(i) wijvj(k). Using the fact that
E[vj(k)] = 0 and Var[
∑N
j=1 vj(k)] =
∑N
j=1 Var[vj(k)], we have E[zi(k)] = 0 and Var[zi(k)] = γ
2
∑
j∈N(i) w
2
ijσ
2
j .
The lemma follows from setting s2i = γ
2
∑
j∈N(i) w
2
ijσ
2
j .
For analysis, we use the network-level update law
x¯(k + 1) = P x¯(k) + z(k). (7)
The main result of this paper uses the fact that a stochastic matrix P can serve as the transition matrix of a Markov
chain and the properties of the Markov chain can be used to analyze the network dynamics associated with P .
Before stating our main results we first define the conditions under which a network modeled by an undirected,
weighted, connected graph can be modeled as a Markov chain and establish the properties of this Markov chain.
Lemma 4: For an undirected, weighted, simple, connected graph G, let γ > 0 be given. If for all i the graph
weights are designed such that γ
∑
j∈N(i) wij < 1, then the matrix P = I − γL(G) is doubly stochastic.
Proof: The weighted graph Laplacian has row i
Lrow i(G) =
[
−wi1 . . .
∑
j∈N(i) wij . . . −win
]
.
Then row i of P is row i of I − γL(G), which is
Prow i =
[
γwi1 . . . 1− γ
∑
j∈N(i) wij . . . γwin
]
.
If agents i and j are not neighbors, then wij = 0, which implies that
∑
j∈N(i) wij =
∑N
j=1
j 6=i
wij . Then
N∑
j=1
Pij = 1− γ
∑
j∈N(i)
wij + γ
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
wij = 1 for all i.
Because wij ≥ 0 and γ
∑
j∈N(i) wij < 1, every entry of P is greater than or equal to 0. Because the sum of every
row of P is 1 and every entry is greater than or equal to 0, P is row stochastic. The same procedure can be used
to show that P is column stochastic because wij = wji for all (i, j) ∈ E. Therefore P is doubly stochastic.
Graph Laplacian properties can be used to make stronger statements. In particular, the Laplacian of an undirected
graph is always symmetric, and therefore P is symmetric. Let the stationary distribution of the Markov chain be
π, which satisfies πTP = πT . With the symmetry of P we have the following explicit form for π.
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9Lemma 5: If P is symmetric, then its stationary distribution is π = 1
N
1.
Proof: See [25, Chapter 4].
Furthermore, we can make a stronger statement about P .
Lemma 6: Let γ ∈
(
0, 1
dmax
)
. If G is connected, simple, and finite, then P = I−γL(G) is irreducible, aperiodic,
positive recurrent, and reversible.
Proof: The fact that G is connected and finite implies P = I − γL(G) is irreducible [26, Chaper 1]. G being
connected and simple along with γ ∈
(
0, 1
dmax
)
and Lemma 4 imply that P has self loops and thus is aperiodic
[26, Chapter 1]. The existence of π implies positive recurrence [26, Theorem 21.12]. Lastly, the above properties
along with the symmetry of P allow us to use Kolmogorov’s Criteria to deduce that P is reversible [27, Section
1.5].
Lemmas 4-6 allow us to develop bounds on the steady state error in Equation (5) using [18]. That work details
several specific cases of consensus protocols with noise vectors of the form in Equation (7). However, for this paper
we are only interested in the results when P is symmetric and the noise is i.i.d, which take the following form.
Lemma 7 (From [18]): If P is irreducible, aperiodic, and reversible, and if the noises at the nodes are uncorre-
lated, such that the off diagonal elements of Z are 0 and z(k) ∼ N (0, Z), then ess is bounded via(
min
1≤i≤N
s2iπi
)
K(P 2) ≤ ess ≤
(
max
1≤i≤N
s2iπi
)
K(P 2),
where K(P 2) is the Kemeny constant of the Markov chain with transition matrix P 2. 
In this work, given that P = I − γL(G), we wish to relate K(P 2) to the agents’ graph topology encoded in
L(G). We do so with the following bound.
Lemma 8: Let P be the transition matrix of a finite, irreducible, and reversible Markov chain. Let λ2(P ) be the
second largest eigenvalue of P . Then the Kemeny constant K(P ) is bounded via N−12 < K(P ) ≤ N−11−λ2(P ) and
N − 1
2
< K(P 2) ≤ N − 1
1− (1− γλ2(L(G)))2 .
Proof: The bounds on K(P ) are derived in [28]. These results also imply N−12 < K(P
2) ≤ N−11−λ2(P 2) . Then,
because λ2(P
2) = λ2(P )
2 = [1− γλ2(L(G))]2, we have
N − 1
2
< K(P 2) ≤ N − 1
1− (1− γλ2(L(G)))2 . 
B. Solving Problem 1
Now we state the first of our main results: a bound on performance in terms of agents’ level of privacy and
underlying graph topology.
Theorem 1: Consider the network-level private formation control protocol x¯(k+ 1) = (I − γL(G))x¯(k) + z(k).
If γ
∑
j∈N(i) wij < 1, γ ∈
(
0, 1
dmax
)
, G is connected and undirected, and σi ≥ κ(δi, ǫi)bi for all i, then ess is
upper-bounded by
ess ≤ γ(N − 1)
2 maxi κ(δi, ǫi)
2b2i
Nλ2(L(G))(2 − γλ2(L(G))) .
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Proof: With Lemma 7, ess ≤
(
maxi s
2
iπi
)
K(P 2). Then using Lemma 8 to upper bound K(P 2) gives
ess ≤
(
maxi s
2
i πi
)
(N − 1)
γλ2(L(G))(2 − γλ2(L(G))) .
Recalling from Lemma 3 that s2i = γ
2
∑
j∈N(i) w
2
ijσ
2
j , we have
ess ≤
(
maxi πiγ
2
∑
j∈N(i) w
2
ijσ
2
j
)
(N − 1)
γλ2(L(G))(2 − γλ2(L(G))) .
Then, because πi =
1
N
for all i and wij ∈ (0, 1),
max
i
πiγ
2
∑
j∈N(i)
w2ijσ
2
j ≤
γ2
N
max
i
(
|N(i)| max
j∈N(i)
σ2j
)
.
For N agents |N(i)| ≤ N − 1, σ2i = κ(δi, ǫi)2b2i , and maxi[maxj∈N(i) σ2j ] = maxi σ2i , which gives
γ2
N
max
i
[|N(i)| max
j∈N(i)
σ2j ] ≤
γ2(N − 1)
N
max
i
κ(δi, ǫi)
2b2i .
Plugging this result back into the upper bound gives
ess ≤ γ(N − 1)
2 maxi κ(δi, ǫi)
2b2i
Nλ2(L(G))(2 − γλ2(L(G))) .
We can simplify Theorem 1 when each agent has the same privacy parameters. Next, and from this point on, we
consider the case where σ = κ(δ, ǫ)b so that each agent adds the minimum amount of noise needed to attain (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy.
Corollary 1 (Homogeneous Privacy Parameters): Let each agent in the network have the privacy parameters ǫ
and δ and the adjacency parameter b. Then
ess ≤ γκ(δ, ǫ)
2b2(N − 1)2
Nλ2(L(G))(2 − γλ2(L(G))) .
The rest of the paper focuses on the homogeneous case presented in Corollary 1, though all forthcoming results
are easily adapted to the heterogeneous case by considering minima and maxima over all agents where appropriate.
V. NETWORK DESIGN GUIDELINES
In this section we give guidelines for designing a differentially private formation control network. Consider N
agents with homogeneous privacy parameters ǫ and δ. The goal is to design the network so that ess does not exceed
a given limit eR. The question of interest is: Given a specific communication topology, how much privacy is each
agent allowed to have for ess ≤ eR? As noted in Remark 1, we do this for each dimension of formation control
individually. A smaller value of ǫ corresponds to being more private. Therefore an upper bound on ess, which is
the measure of system performance, implies a lower bound on ǫ, each agent’s privacy parameter.
We derive an impossibility result and sufficient conditions in terms of ǫ for ess ≤ eR for specific networks. We
consider connected graphs G with uniform weights, where wij = w for all (i, j) ∈ E. By construction, the graphs
we consider in this paper are weight-balanced, which implies that for any weights, the protocol in Equation (2)
will converge to the unweighted average as seen in Lemma 2. Throughout this section we fix δ to be some small
number and let ǫ vary to tune the level of privacy, which is common in differential privacy implementations [29].
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In general, a more connected topology, i.e., one with larger λ2(G), can accommodate stronger privacy and still
achieve the desired level of performance. This principle is used to determine the conditions under which it is
impossible to satisfy ess ≤ eR, shown next.
Theorem 2 (Impossibility Result): Given a network of N agents with specified ǫ, δ, b, and eR, compute λ2(G).
Then ess ≤ eR cannot be assured if
ǫ <
2bz1
NeRλ2(G)
(
b+
eRKδλ2(G)N√
eRz1λ2(G)N
)
,
where z1 =
γ(N−1)2
2−γλ2(G) .
Proof: Being unable to achieve ess ≤ eR is equivalent to requiring
γκ(δ, ǫ)2b2(N − 1)2
Nλ2(L(G))(2 − γλ2(L(G))) > eR.
This holds if and only if
κ(δ, ǫ)2b2 >
Nλ2(L(G))(2 − γλ2(L(G)))eR
γ(N − 1)2 .
Then, using κ(δ, ǫ)2 = 14ǫ2 (Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2ǫ)
2, we solve for ǫ, giving
ǫ <
2bz1
NeRλ2(G)
(
b+
eRKδλ2(G)N√
eRz1λ2(G)N
)
. 
We now derive necessary and sufficient conditions for assuring ess ≤ eR for common graphs: the complete
graph, line graph, cycle graph, and star graph. These conditions can easily be checked a priori and give a network
designer a simple means of determining whether a specific network will meet performance requirements. Proofs of
Corollaries 3-5 are similar to that of Corollary 2 and are omitted.
Corollary 2 (Complete graph): The complete graph has algebraic connectivity λ2(L(G)) = wN [30]. Consider
a network of N agents with specified ǫ, δ, γ, b, w, and eR, and communication topology modeled by the complete
graph. The network can be shown to satisfy ess ≤ eR if and only if
ǫ ≥ 2bγ(N − 1)
2
N2eRw(2 − γwN)
(
b+
eRKδwN
√
2− γwN)
(N − 1)√eRγw
)
.
Proof: The complete graph satisfies the design requirements if ess ≤ eR. This is assured if γκ(δ,ǫ)
2b2(N−1)2
Nλ2(L(G))(2−γλ2(L(G))) ≤
eR, which holds if and only if
κ(δ, ǫ)2b2 ≤ Nλ2(L(G))(2 − γλ2(L(G)))eR
γ(N − 1)2 .
For the complete graph with all weights equal to w, we have λ2(L(G)) = wN and thus we require
κ(δ, ǫ)2b2 ≤ wN
2(2− γwN)eR
γ(N − 1)2 .
Then using κ(δ, ǫ)2 = 14ǫ2 (Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2ǫ)
2 we solve the inequality for ǫ to find
ǫ ≥ 2bγ(N − 1)
2
N2eRw(2 − γwN)
(
b+
eRKδwN
√
2− γwN)
(N − 1)√eRγw
)
. 
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Graph
N
10 100 1, 000 10, 000
Complete 0.0074 0.0081 0.0084 0.0116
Cycle 0.0380 1.4514 199.35 159591
Line 0.7533 3.2127 714.70 635752
Star 0.0235 0.0820 0.2661 0.8849
TABLE I: Comparison of the lower bounds on ǫ for various communication topologies and numbers of agents. This
table illustrates that more-connected graphs accommodate privacy better when the network size grows, because they
allow ǫ to be smaller, which gives stronger privacy protections.
Corollary 3 (Cycle Graph): The cycle graph has algebraic connectivity λ2(L(G)) = 2w
(
1− cos( 2π
N
))
[30].
Consider a network of N agents with specified ǫ, δ, γ, b, w, and eR, and communication topology modeled by the
cycle graph. The network is assured to satisfy ess ≤ eR if and only if
ǫ ≥ bz2
NeR2w
(
1− cos( 2π
N
)) + Kδ√
z2eRw
(
1− cos( 2π
N
))
N
,
where z2 =
(N−1)2γ
1−γw(1−cos( 2piN ))
.
Corollary 4 (Line Graph): The line graph has algebraic connectivity λ2(L(G)) = 2w
(
1− cos( π
N
))
[30]. Con-
sider a network of N agents with specified ǫ, δ, γ, b, w, and communication topology modeled by the line graph.
The network is assured to satisfy ess ≤ eR if and only if
ǫ ≥ bz3
NeR2w
(
1− cos( π
N
)) + Kδ√
z3eRw
(
1− cos( π
N
))
N
,
where z3 =
(N−1)2γ
1−γw(1−cos( piN ))
.
Corollary 5 (Star Graph): The star graph has algebraic connectivity λ2(L(G)) = w [30]. Consider a network
of N agents with specified ǫ, δ, γ, b, w, and eR, and communication topology modeled by the star graph. The
network is assured to satisfy ess ≤ eR if and only if
ǫ ≥ 2bγ(N − 1)
2
NeRw(2 − γw)
(
b+
eRKδwN
√
2− γw)
(N − 1)√eRγwN
)
.
Remark 2: Fix δ = 0.01, b = 5,w = 1, γ = 10−4, and eR = 100. The lower bounds on ǫ found in Corollaries
2-5 were calculated numerically for networks with a varying number of agents, the results of which are in Table I.
VI. SENSITIVITY RESULTS
Theorem 1 and Corollaries 2-5 show that performance of a network is a function of the network topology, each
agent’s privacy parameters, adjacency relationship, step size, and the number of agents. Some of these parameters
are global, in that the parameter depends on the entire network, and some are local, in that the parameter can
change at the agent level. For example, the network communication topology is a global parameter while each
agent’s privacy parameter, ǫ, is a local parameter.
September 15, 2020 DRAFT
13
Consider the following example: Given a network that is not performing as desired, one option is to change the
network’s topology and allow more agents to communicate, while another option is loosening the agents’ privacy
requirements. Depending on design constraints, it may be more effective to allow more agents to communicate
or to relax privacy requirements. It is useful to understand when changing ǫ is more effective than changing the
network topology and vice versa. In this section we therefore analyze how sensitive network performance is to
local changes in privacy and global changes in topology.
We start by letting ess equal the upper bound found earlier, ess =
γ(Kδ+
√
K2
δ
+2ǫ)2b2(N−1)2
4ǫ2Nλ2(L(G))(2−γλ2(L(G))) . Define λ(δ, ǫ) =
Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2ǫ. Now we take the partial derivatives with respect to ǫ and λ2(L(G)):
∂ess
∂ǫ
=
γ(N − 1)2b2
4Nλ2(2− γλ2)
(
2λ(δ, ǫ)
ǫ2
√
(K2δ + 2ǫ)
− 2λ
2(δ, ǫ)
ǫ3
)
∂ess
∂λ2
=
γλ2(δ, ǫ)(N − 1)2b2
4ǫ2Nλ2(2− γλ2)
(
γ
2− γλ2 −
1
λ2
)
.
These partial derivatives give an understanding of how much ess changes with a change in either ǫ or the network
topology. As mentioned previously, we would like to determine when changing one is more effective than the other,
which leads to the following result.
Theorem 3: Let α = ǫ2 +
3ǫK2δ
2 +
1
γ2
+
K4δ
2 ,
η1 =
2ǫγ + γK2δ + 2
2γ
+
1
2
√
2ǫK2δ +K
4
δ ,
and η2 =
2ǫγ+γK2δ+2
2γ − 12
√
2ǫK2δ +K
4
δ .
Then ess is more sensitive to λ2 than ǫ when
λ2 > η1 −
√
K2δ (4ǫ
2 + 4ǫK2δ +K
4
δ )
2
√
2ǫK2δ +K
4
δ
+ α,
or when
λ2 < η2 −
√
−K
2
δ (4ǫ
2 + 4ǫK2δ +K
4
δ )
2
√
2ǫK2δ +K
4
δ
+ α.
Proof: ∂ess
∂λ2
and ∂ess
∂ǫ
are both negative, so ess is more sensitive to λ2 when
∂ess
∂λ2
< ∂ess
∂ǫ
. This occurs when(
ǫγ
A
− γ)λ22 + (2 + ǫγ − 2ǫA )λ2 − ǫ < 0 where A = (Kδ +√K2δ + 2ǫ)√(K2δ + 2ǫ). This inequality is satisfied
by the bounds in the Theorem statement.
Remark 3: These results can be formulated in such a way that there is some cost associated with changing
λ2(L(G)) and a cost associated with changing ǫ. Making an optimal change to achieve performance criteria will
largely depend on application. This will be explored in a future publication.
The results presented in Theorem 3 can be instantiated for specific graphs. For example, consider the following.
Corollary 6: Let δ = 0.00135, such that Kδ = 3, and let ǫ = 0.01. Let γ =
1
10 . The network’s performance is
more sensitive to the network topology than ǫ when λ2 > 5.55134.
To illustrate these results, consider the following. The star graph over N = 10 nodes has λ2 = 1, which implies
that the network’s performance is more sensitive to changes in the privacy parameter ǫ. The complete graph over
N = 10 nodes has λ2 = 10, which implies the network’s performance is more sensitive to changes in the network
topology.
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Fig. 1: Agent 1’s error in the first element of its state and the upper bound on ess. The upper bound is on the
steady state value of ess, however it holds point-wise in time for e11 and components of other agents’ states.
Fig. 2: A plot of ess for different levels of privacy and connectedness. We fix δ = 0.01 and N = 50 and let ǫ and
λ2 vary. It can be seen that the largest error occurs when agents are not well-connected, which gives small λ2, and
when agents keep information very private, which gives small ǫ.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present private formation control simulation results and illustrate the results in Theorem 1.
A. Simulation of Differentially Private Formation Control
Consider a network of N = 5 agents. Agents i’s state at time k is xi(k) ∈ R2, and every agent’s state trajectory
is in ℓ˜22. The agents’ communication topology is modeled by the star graph over 5 nodes with weights wij = 1 for
all (i, j) ∈ E. The network’s algebraic connectivity is λ2 = 1. The formation specification is
p =

0 −20 20 20 −20
0 20 20 −20 −20


T
,
where row i denotes agent i’s desired location in the formation. Thus p specifies a formation where agents 2-5 will
form a square with agent 1 at the center.
We consider the homogeneous case where each agent has identical privacy parameters, (ǫi, δi) = (ln 3, 0.00135)
for all i and every agent also has an identical adjacency parameter bi = 2 for all i. Let γ =
1
5 . Let e11 denote the
error of the first element of agent 1’s state. The protocol in Equation (4) was run for 100 time steps
Figure 1 shows e11 at every time step as well as the upper bound found in Theorem 1, where we see that e11
never converges to 0 due to the stochastic nature of the protocol, but remains in some neighborhood of 0. The
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bound on ess presented in Theorem 1 is on the expected steady state value of square aggregate error, though we
see that this bound also holds point-wise in time for e11 in this simulation. These results were typical throughout
numerous simulation runs.
B. Theorem 1 Visualization
In Figure 2 we include a visualization of the Results of Theorem 1. The figure considers N = 50 agents and
considers the homogeneous case where each agent has the same privacy parameters. We fix δ = 0.01, γ = 0.02,
and b = 5. The purpose of this figure is to show the effects of changing the graph topology and privacy parameter
ǫ on the upper bound on ess. As the graph topology becomes more connected, λ2 increases monotonically and in
Figure 2 we see that if we fix an epsilon, ess decreases as the topology becomes more connected. A smaller value
of ǫ corresponds to a stricter privacy requirement. Figure 2 shows that as our privacy requirements become more
strict, the upper bound on ess increases. Figure 2 depicts ǫ ∈ [0.1, 1] and λ2 ∈ [0, 50].
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the problem of differentially private formation control. This work enables agents
to assemble formations while only sharing differentially private output data with a bounded steady state error. We
developed guidelines for calibrating privacy under different control-theoretic requirements. The tunable parameters
in this work are the privacy parameters and the topology itself, balancing the corresponding trade offs is a subject
of future work.
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